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The Impact of Expanded Rules for Determining
what Constitutes the "Same Offense" for Double
Jeopardy Purposes: Illinois u. Vitale
On November 20, 1974, a uniformed crossing guard motioned for the school children to cross the street. Five-year-olds
Carrilyn Christakos and George Kech started running across the
streetneither reached the other side. Carrilyn was struck by an
auto that skidded through the intersection. She was thrown
eighty feet and died the following day. After being caught under
the same auto and dragged fifty feet, George died almost
instantly.
The minor driver, John M. Vitale, was issued a traffic citation for failing to reduce speed.' After waiving his right to a jury
trail and pleading not guilty to the charge, Vitale was tried,
found guilty, and fined fifteen dollar^.^ The next day a petition
for adjudication of wardship was filed in which Vitale was
charged with involuntary manslaughter for the deaths of the two
children? The petition was dismissed on Vitale's motion that
the conviction and fine for failing to reduce speed precluded his
again being placed in jeopardy for the same offense?
The State of Illinois appealed and the Appellate Court of
On apIllinois &med for reasons other than double je~pardy.~
1. Police Traffic Accident Report of the Department of Police, Village of South
Holland, Illinois, reprinted in Brief and Argument for Petitioner, Appendix at 21-26,
Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
2. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 411 (1980).
3. The trial was held on December 23, 1974, in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illionis. 447 U.S. at 412. The maximum punishment for failing to reduce speed to avoid
an accident is 30 days in jail or a fine of five hundred dollars. Id. at 412 n.3; Illinois
Vehicle Code 8 16-104, h.REV. STAT.ch. 95%, g 16-104(a) (1973); Unified Code of
Corrections Qg 5-9-1, -8-3, ILL. Rsv. STAT.
ch. 38, gg 1005-9-1, -8-3 (1973).
4. The petition was filed in the Juvenile Division of the Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois. 447 U.S. at 412-13. Vitale was charged with two counts of involuntary
manslaughter pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Code of 1961, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, 8 9-3 (1973). 447 U.S. at 413 n.4.
5. Specifically, the motion was based on the grounds that the prosecution was violative of statutory and constitutional double jeopardy. The Juvenile Court did not reach
the constitutional question. It held that the prosecution was prohibited by Illinois' compulsory joinder statute. 447 U.S. at 413-14 n.5.
6. In re Vitale, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035-38, 358 N.E.2d 1288, 1292-93 (1976). The
court afErmed based on Illinois' compulsory joinder requirements.
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peal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the dismissal order was affirmed on the basis of the "more compelling" grounds of the
double jeopardy clause of the Federal Con~titution.~
After the Illinois Supreme Court certified that its decision
was based on federal constitutional grounds, the United States
The Court held that "[ilf, as
Supreme Court granted ~ertiorari.~
a matter of Illinois law, a careless failure to slow is always a necessary element of manslaughter by automobile, then the two offenses are the 'same' . . . and Vitale's trial on the latter charges
would constitute double jeopardy . . . ."e The Court then vacated the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remanded
the case for clarification of Illinois law and a determination of
what act or acts the state would rely upon to prove involuntary
mamlaughter.1°
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment states:
"[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."I1 The proper understanding and application of this clause depends upon what constitutes the "same offense.'' Although many approaches have
been used to determine what constitutes the "same offense,"12
the Court's current test was articulated in Brown u. Ohio.ls This
test is a variation of the "same evidence" test that was first
enunciated in The King v. Vandercomb & Abbott.14 The indictment in Vandercomb charged a nocturnal breaking followed by
larceny. At trial it was discovered that the larceny had occurred
the day before the nocturnal breaking. The rigid common-law
pleading rules then applicable required that the defendants be
acquitted because of this error in the order of the offenses. To
correct this apparent miscarriage of justice, the court deeided
that "unless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might
7. In re Vitale, 71 Ill. 2d 229, 235, 375 N.E.2d 87, 89 (1978).
8. The State of Illinois petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, which was granted on November 27,1978.447 U.S. at 415. In the order granting the writ, the Court vacated the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court and remanded the case for a determination of whether the judgment was based on federal or
state constitutional grounds. Id. On March 22,1979, the Illinois Supreme Court certified
that its judgment was based on federal constitutional grounds. The Court again granted
a writ of certiorari on October 1, 1979. Illinois v. Vitale, 444 U.S. 823 (1979).
9. 447 U.S. at 419-20. This was a five-to-four decision.
10. Id. a t 421
11. U.S. CONST.amend. V.
12. See 75 YALEL.J. 262, 267-77 (1965).
13. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
14. 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.C.R. 1796).
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have been convicted upon by proof of the facts contained in the
second indictment, an acquittal on the first indictment can be
no bar to the second."16
A modified "same evidence" test was first applied in the
United States in Morey u. Commonwealth.le In Morey a conviction for the sale of intoxicating liquors was held "to bar prosecution for a single sale of such liquors within the same time, upon
. is merged in the greater
the ground that the lesser offense
offense."17 The modified rule stated: "A single act may be an
offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from
prosecution and punishment under the other."18
The Morey version of the "same evidence" rule was adopted
by the Supreme Court in Gavieres v. United States.lBThis version was relied on when the Court recited the currently acknowledged rule in Blockburger v. United state^.'^ The critical issue,
as defined in Blockburger, is "whether each [statutory] provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."'l
In clarifying the Blockburger test, the Court in Brown v.
OhioMstated that "the greater offense is . . . by definition the
'same' for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it."98 The Court added that "the sequence [of the
greater and lesser offenses] ia irn~naterial."~~
The Brown Court also emphasized its role in the interpretation of state law. Quoting from Garner u. Louisiana," it noted
that the state courts "have final authority to interpret . . . that
The Court further pointed out that the
state's legislati~n."~~
freedom of the legislature to "define crimes and fix punishments" is unrestrained by the double jeopardy clause.27Once the
legislature has acted, "courts may not impose more than one

..

-

15. Id. at 461.
16. 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
17. Id. at 435.
18. Id. at 434.
19. 220 US. 338, 342-43 (1911).
20. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
21. Id. at 304.
22. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
23. Id. at 168.
24. Id.
25. 368 US. 157 (1961).
26. 432 U.S. at 167.
27. Id. at 165.

-

--

p
p

-
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punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may
not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial."28
Subsequent to Brown the "same evidence" test was applied
in Harris v. Oklah~mcr.~@
The Harris Court held that robbery
was a lesser-included offense of felony murder since " 'proof of
the underlying felony [here robbery with firearms] is needed to
prove the intent for a felony murder conviction.'
The Court's
next application of the "same evidence" test occured in the instant case.
In the instant case the Court acknowledged Brown and its
application of Blockburger as the "principal test" to determine
what constitutes the "same offense" for double jeopardy." The
Court recognized that application of the Blockburger test relies
on the abstract proof necessary to establish the statutory elements, rather than on the actual proof to be presented at trial.sa
The Court also noted the Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on
Brownss and acknowledged the propriety of the state supreme
court defining the statutory elements of the two crimesY The
Court was uncertain, however, whether the Illinois Supreme
Court properly applied Brown to the facts in the instant case:'
This uncertainty centered on the Court's determination that
Brown requires a two-pronged test for the lesser-included off e n ~ eThe
. ~ ~first prong is the traditional Blockburger test that
requires that every element of the lesser-included offense also be
an element of the greater offense.87The second prong requires
28. Id.
29. 433 US. 682 (1977).
30. Id. (bracketa in original) (quoting Harris v. State, 555 P.2d 76, 80-81 (Okla.
1976)).
31. 447 US. at 416.
32. Id.
33. The Court stated: "The Illinois court relied upon our holding in Brown v. Ohio,
432 US. 161 (1977), that a conviction for a leeser-included offense precludes later prosecution for the greater offense." Id. at 417.
34. The Court conceded: "We accept, as we must, the Supreme Court of Illinois'
identification of the elementa of the offenses involved here." Id. at 416.
35. Id. at 416-19.
36. The Court analyzed Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), as follows: "The Ohio
courts had held that every element of the joyriding 'is also an element of the crime of
auto theft,' . . .we also noted that 'the prowcutor who has established auto theft necessarily has established joyriding as well.' " 447 U.S. at 417. The Court continued its analysis by pointing out that "[bloth otmervations were essential to the Brown holding . . . if
proof of the auto theft had not necegaarily involved proof of joyriding . . ." the offenses
would not have been the same for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 417.
37. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
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that the establishment of the greater offense necessarily establish the lesser offense?
The Court observed that the first prong was clearly met in
the instant case:s but was uncertain whether the second prong
was satisfied. In the Court's view the Illinois Supreme Court was
"cryptic" in its analysis because it failed to address the contention that under Illinois law the establishment of involuntary
manslaughter by means of a motor vehicle necessarily establishes the offense of failing to reduce speed.'O Although the
Court recognized the role of the state supreme court in interpreting Illinois law, it concluded that under Illinois law failing to
reduce speed may not necessarily be established when involuntary manslaughter by means of a motor vehicle is established. If
it is not, the Blockburger test (as now defined with the two
prongs) was not satisfied."
The Court then offered another approach to double jeopardy protection. This new application of the Blockburger test focused on the actual proof to be presented at trial rather than the
abstract proof necessary to establish the statutory elements.4s
Under this new approach the Court concluded that Vitale would
have a "substantial" double jeopardy claim if the state plans to
prove that failing to reduce speed is the reckless act required to
establish the manslaughter offense?
38. Illinois v. Vitale, 447 US. at 418.
39. Id.
40. Id. The Court stated:
The Illinois Supreme Court did not expressly address the contentions that
manslaughter by automobile could be proved without also proving a careless
failure to reduce speed and we are reluctant to accept its rather cryptic remarks about the relationship between the two offenses involved here as an authoritative holding that under Illinois law proof of manslaughter by automobile
would always involve a careless failure to reduce speed to avoid a collision.
Id. at 419.
41. Id. at 419.
42. This approach was presented after the Court had already arrived at its holding
in the instant case. Id. at 420-21. It is different, however, from the approach taken in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Referring to Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161 (1977), the Vitale Court noted: "We recognized that the Blockburger test focusee on
the proof necessary to prove the statutory elements of each offense, rather than on the
actual evidence to be presented at trial." 447 U.S. at 416 (emphasis added).
43. As authority for this proposition the Court cited Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161
(1977) and Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977). 447 U.S. at 420. In Harris the Court
"treated a killing in the course of a robbery as itself a separate statutory offense, and the
robbery as a species of lesser-included offense." Id. After noting that "the state conceded
that the robbery . . . was in fact the underlying felony, all elements of which h d been
proved in the murder prosecution," the Court concluded that the offenses were the
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In ultimately deciding to vacate the judgment and remand
the case to the Illinois Supreme Court, the Court emphasized
two points.44First, the Court was unable to determine whether
under the Blockburger test the two offenses are the "same" for
double jeopardy purposes because the relationship under Illinois
law between the offenses of failing to reduce speed and involuntary manslaughter by means of a motor vehicle was unclear. Secondly, the Court was uncertain what actual proof would be used
at trial to establish the offense of involuntary manslaughter by
means of a motor vehicle.46
The individual desire for justice might be satisfied by a decision that allows further prosecution of one who carelessly
caused the deaths of two five-year-old children and whose only
penalty was a fifteen dollar fine." The individual desire for justice, however, must be tempered by the Court's duty to effect
uniform justice and to provide sound precedent.
In the instant case, the Court's opinion fails to balance the
individual desire for justice with the far-reaching impact of the
decision. Without addressing the impact of its opinion, the
Court severely limited the constitutional guarantees against
double jeopardy. The extension of Brown limited these guarantees in three ways. First, the Court expanded the traditional
Blockburger test by adding a second prong that severely narrows
the category of offenses that may be considered the "same" for
double jeopardy purposes. Secondly, the Court developed an alternative approach for determining the "same offense." The new
approach relies on the actual proof to be presented at trial
rather than the abstract proof required to establish the statutory
elements. This approach complicates the "same offense" determination when the lesser offense is prosecuted first. Finally, the
Court arguably involved itself in interpretation of state law for
double jeopardy purposes. Traditionally, the Court has left interpretation of state law in this area to the state legislature and
state courts.
"same" for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added).
44. 447 U.S. at 421.
45. Id.
46. This fine was not the maximum punishment allowed by law. The maximum punishment allowed is 30 days in jail or a h e of five hundred dollars.
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Adding a Second Prong to the Traditional Blockburger Test
The Court's decision in Brown clearly established the acceptance of the traditional Blockburger test: "The applicable
rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does
not."4v The key word in the traditional Blockburger test is "re'~
the
quires." The Court in Gavieres v. United s t a t e ~ illustrated
importance of the word "requires" by applying statutory requirements to find that two offenses were not the "same" for
double jeopardy purposes. One of the offenses required proof
that the conduct occurred in a public place, but did not necessarily require proof that a public official was insulted. The other
offense required proof that a public official was insulted, but did
not necessarily require proof that he was insulted in a public
place. The offenses were determined not to be the "same" since
each statute required proof that the other did not.'@
In the instant case the Blockburger test, which is based on
Gavieres, seemingly mandates a determination that the offenses
are the "same" for double jeopardy purposes. Although Vitale
could have been reckless in ways other than failing to reduce
speedy the statute does not require that the reckless action be
something different from failing to reduce speed. Motor vehicle
statutes only require that a reckless act occur in the operation of
a motor vehicle for involuntary manslaughter to be e~tablished.~'
Clearly, failure to reduce speed is a lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter by a motor vehicle under the traditional
Blockburger test.
The Court, however, was apparently not satisfied in the instant case with the result obtained by application of the traditional Blockburger test. The Court, to arrive at the desired result, interpreted Brown as adding a second prong to the
47. 432 U.S. 161, 166 (19'77) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304 (1932)) (emphasii added).
48. 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
49. Id. at 342.
50. See 441 U.S. at 419.
51. Involuntary manslaughter by means of a motor vehicle requires among other
things that "the ads which cause the death consist of the driving of a motor vehicle" and
that the driver "performs them recklessly." Criminal Code of 1961, ICL. REV.STAT.ch.
38, 5 9-3 (1973).
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traditional test. This second prong requires that proof of the
greater offense will necessarily establish the lesser offense.s2
Waller v. Floridass illustrates the extent to which the
Court's application of this two-pronged test varies from its application of the traditional Blockburger test in pre-Brown decisions. The petitioner in Waller was convicted of destruction of
city property and was later charged with grand larceny. The
Court considered the offenses the "same," and thus the trial for
.~
grand larceny was prohibited on double jeopardy g r o ~ n d s Interestingly, the Court accepted the assumption that the destruction of city property was a lesser-included offense of grand larceny." Acceptance of this assumption under the traditional
Blockburger test raises no questions. Under the new test, however, acceptance of this assumption would mean that the Court
would either conclude that the offenses were not the "same" or
acknowledge that a conviction for grand larceny would also necessarily establish the lesser offense of destruction of city
property.
Application of this second prong in the instant case led the
Court to the conclusion that a failure to reduce speed is not a
lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter by means of
a motor v e h i ~ l ethus,
; ~ the state was allowed to prosecute Vitale
on the charge of involuntary manslaughter. Although this conclusion may satisfy an individual's narrow concept of justice in
the instant case, it is inconsistent with the Court's previous decision in Harris v. O k l a h ~ m a . ~ ~
Harris was decided per curium subsequent to the Brown decision. In Harris, the Court found that robbery was a lesser-included offense of felony-murder? The decision, on its face, contradicts the second prong of the test applied in the instant case.
Felony-murder under Oklahoma law could be established by
proof of any underlying felony, not just robbery.6@
Applying the
second prong, however, would require that robbery would have
to necessarily be established when felony-murder is proven.
The Vitale Court sidestepped this inconsistency in it3 anal447
397

U.S. at 418.
U.S. 387 (1970).

Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 390.
See 447 U.S. at 419.
433

U.S. 682 (1977).

Id.
OKLA.STAT.tit. 21, 5 701(3) (1971).
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ysis of Harris by making two significant changes from Brown.
First, the Court involved itself in the interpretation of state law.
The Oklahoma'law upon which Harris was decided stated that
homicide is murder "[wlhen perpetrated without any design to
effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony."" The Court used its own definition of Oklahoma law to
make Harris consistent with the application of the second prong
in the instant case. In describing this redefinition the Court
stated: "[Wle treated a killing in the course of a robbery as itself
a separate statutory offense, and robbery as itself a species of
lesser-included offense?' Although this redefinition was necessary for consistency with the second prong of the test, it nevertheless marked a significant change from the traditional approach of leaving definition of state law to the state.62
Secondly, the Court used actual proof presented at trial
rather than the proof needed to establish the statutory elements
in the abstract to analyze Harris. Under the traditional application of the Blockburger test, the Court would have analyzed
Harris by looking to the proof required to meet the abstract
statutory elements of the offense.6s The Court instead justified
its decision that the offenses were the "same" on the ground
"[tlhe State conceded that the robbery for which petitioner had
been indicted was in fact the underlying felony, all elements of
which had been proved in the murder p r o s e ~ u t i o n . 'Although
~
this use of actual proof supported the Court's finding that the
offense was the "same" under the second prong, the use of such
proof is contrary to the application of the Blockburger test as
explained in Brown.66
The result in the instant case clearly demonstrates that the
addition of the second prong to the test has severely narrowed
the category of offenses that may be considered the "same" for
double jeopardy purposes. For example, under the second prong,
offenses such as felony-murder will never have lesser-included
offenses. Since more than one underlying felony can be used to
prove felony-murder, no particular underlying felony would be
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. 447 U.S. at 420.
62. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167 (1977) (quoting Garner v. Louisiana, 368
U.S. 157, 169 (1961)).
63. See 447 U.S. at 416.
64. Id. at 420-21 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 416: In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977), the test is "whether each
[statutory] provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not . . . ."
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"necessarily" established when a felony-murder is proved. Although this narrowing of double jeopardy protection is extremely important, the Court's opinion does not discuss the
matter?

Use of Actual Proof to be Presented at Trial
In its analysis of Harris the Court developed a new approach that focused on the actual evidence to be presented at
trial. The offenses were determined to be the "same" since "all
elements [of the robbery] . . . had been proved in the murder
pr~secution."~~
This approach differs from the traditional Blockburger test that "focuses on the proof necessary to prove the
statutory elements of each offense, rather than the actual evidence to be presented at trial."m Although the Court was willing
to modify the traditional Blockburger test, its opinion unfortunately did not address the weaknesses of this new approa~h.~@
A primary weakness in the approach is that whereas the abstract statutory elements of an offense are definable with some
certainty before the case is prosecuted, the actual evidence to be
presented at trial is uncertain.70 The statutory elements of the
66. This narrowing could be avoided by redefining all offenses such as felony-murder so that they are composed of one and only one underlying offense. Thus, a general
felony-murder statute could be replaced by separate statutes for rape-murder, robberymurder, burglary-murder, and so forth. The redefinition of such offenses would necessarily be comprehensive rather than selective in its scope, otherwise the second prong
could still lead to arbitrary application of double jeopardy protections.
67. 447 U.S. at 420-21.
68. Id. at 416.
69. The dissenting opinion in the instant case exposed one weakness of this new
approach:
Throughout the five years that this case has been in litigation, the State
has apparently not seen fit to reveal the basis of ita homicide prosecution. The
Court does not view this omission as an important one. On the contrary, its
opinion implies that the State may proceed to trial before a determination is
made on [Vitale's] double jeopardy claim. But surely such a procedure is inconsistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause, which was specifically designed to
protect the citizen from multiple trials.
. . Since the State has not provided [Vitale] with notice of any basis for
prosecution that does not depend on proving, for the second time, a careless
failure to reduce speed, I would not require [Vitale] to stand trial again."
Id. at 426-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. The Court observed that "the reckless act or acts the State will rely on to prove
the manslaughter are still unknown . . Id. at 421. Note that the instant case was
decided June 19, 1980. The petition for adjudication of wardship based on the involuntary manslaughter charge was filed December 24, 1974. Although the petition was fled
over five years before this case was decided, the state had not made known to Vitale the
reckl;' act or acts that it would rely on to support the involuntary manslaughter charge.

.

. ."
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offense are not controlled by either of the parties involved in the
action. The actual evidence presented at trial is, on the other
hand, subject to the prosecutor's discretion.
Total certainty as to what will be presented at trial is not
possible until trial. If the Court requires total certainty, the new
approach will only be useable in cases where the greater offense
is prosecuted before the lesser offense. When the lesser offense is
prosecuted first, for example, one of the several alternative elements of the greater offense may be proved without any indication of which of these alternative elements will be presented to
prove the greater offense. If, on the other hand, the Court will
accept less than total certainty, standards must be developed to
determine before the fact what is to be presented in the prosecution. Along with these standards sanctions must be provided to
ensure that the standards are followed. These standards must
not be so cumbersome that compliance with them will defeat the
value of the double jeopardy guarantees. For example, if compliance in effect compels the defendant to substantially prepare for
trial, he will have already lost those rights that the double jeopardy clause was intended to protect.''
The Court's decision not only imposes substantial and expensive pre-trial preparation on the defendant, it also erodes the
policies underlying double jeopardy protection in other ways.
The purpose of the double jeopardy prohibition is to prevent
"the state with all its resources and power" from subjecting the
individual "to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity
. . . ."" By neither knowing whether the state would prosecute
nor what evidence its case would rest on, Vitale and others in
similar situations suffer embarrassment, anxiety, and insecurity
along with the expense and ordeal of a second prosecution.

The dissent contended that this failure to timely apprise Vitale of the prosecution
theory should bar the second trial. Id. at 423.
71. "The specific purposes of the [double jeopardy] protection are the avoidance of
unnecessary harrassment, the avoidance of social stigma, the economy of time and
money, and the interest in psychological security." J. SIGLER,
DOUBLE
JEOPARDY
156
(1969).
72. Green v. United States, 355

U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
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The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Defining
State Law for Double Jeopardy Purposes
In Garner u. LouisianaTsthe Court expressed its position on
the role of state courts in the interpretation of state law. The
Court recognized "that Louisiana courts have the final authority
to interpret and, where they see fit, to reinterpret that state's
legi~lation."~~
Accordingly, the Court was reluctant to interfere
with a state court's settled interpretation of Louisiana law.?'
This traditional reluctance was reiterated in Brown. After
paraphrasing the above quote from Garner, the Court stated
that "the Ohio Court of Appeals has authoritatively defined the
elements of the two Ohio crimes . . .
Based on the state
court's authoritative definition of Ohio law, the Court applied
the traditional Blockburger test. The Court's discussion of the
effect a different definition of Ohio law would have had on the
decision further illustrates its reluctance to deviate from its
traditional role. The Court emphasized that either the legislature could have written the law differently or the state courts
could have construed the law differently. Specifically, the Court
stated that the state would have prevailed if the legislature had
worded the Ohio statute or the state courts had interpreted it to
make joyriding "a separate offense for each day in which a motor vehicle is operated without the owner's consent."77 The
Court, however, refrained from making that interpretation itself.
By contrast, in the instant case the Court did interpret state
law as it analyzed Harris? In applying the second prong of the
test the Court wrote:
The Oklahoma felony murder statute on its face did not require proof of a robbery to establish felony murder; other felonies could underlie a felony murder prosecution. But for the
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, we did not consider a
crime generally described as felony murder as a separate offense distinct from its various elements. Rather, we treated a
killing in the course of a robbery as itself a separate statutory
offense, and the robbery as a species of lesser-included
73. 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
74. Id. at 169 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. 432 U.S. 161, 167 (1977).
77. Id. at 169-70 n.8. The Ohio state courts had never interpreted joyriding as a
separate offense for each day.
78. See 447 U.S. at 420.
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The Court's departure from its traditional approach was required to harmonize its application of the second prong of the
test in Harris with the instant case. The Court's unprincipled
departure from precedent raises the question of what role the
Court will play in the future in the interpretation of state law.
Traditionally, interpretation of state law has been based on an
analysis of legislative history and a review of pertinent state
court decisions. These state court decisions have applied state
law in a variety of settings, not just the double jeopardy context.
The Court's consideration of these laws as they relate only to
double jeopardy claims will necessarily be less extensive than
the traditional approaches that state legislatures and state
courts have taken. Additionally, there is concern that the Court
may, as it has done in the instant case, change its established
rules and look principally at the apparent justice of the case
before it. Such an approach would diminish the important protections that the double jeopardy clause currently guarantees.
Prior to Vitale the United States Supreme Court consistently applied the well settled Blockburger test for determining
what is the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. Concerned, apparently, with the outcome that the traditional Blockburger test would have mandated in the instant case, the Court
drastically modified the Blockburger test and its application.
The traditional test considers offenses the "same" when the
lesser offense does not require proof of any facts in addition to
those required to establish the greater offense. The modified test
considers offenses the "same" only when the lesser offense must
necessarily be established when the greater offense is established. This modification narrows the number of offenses that
will be considered the "same" by the Court.
Traditionally, the test was applied by leaving to the state
the definition of the statutory elements of the offenses. In the
instant case the Court modified this approach by defining the
statutory elements itself. The Court also modified the traditional approach by considering the actual proof to be presented
at trial to establish the offense, rather than the abstract proof
necessary to prove the statutory elements. These approach modifications allow the Court to be arbitrary in what statutory elements will be considered. Additionally, the defendant may lose
79. Id.
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important double jeopardy protection simply because he is unsure as to what actual proof will be presented at trial and thus
whether or not the prosecution will be barred on double jeopardy grounds.
The Court should retreat to the traditional Blockburger test
and its application in order to keep intact our important double
jeopardy guarantees.

David G. Harlow

